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Executive summary
A series of banking scandals in multiple European Union countries including Cyprus, Den-
mark, Estonia, Latvia, Malta, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom has underlined the 
shortcomings of the European Union’s anti-money laundering (AML) regime. Many of these 
cases have involved staggering sums, with billions of dollars laundered through accounts at 
one bank. The impact of the EU’s AML shortcomings has been further underlined by chang-
ing geopolitics and by the new reality of European banking union.
The EU legal framework combines a strong, enforceable single market with national AML 
supervision of banks and other financial and non-financial firms in which the mechanisms to 
ensure EU-wide supervisory consistency are insufficient. This combination fosters a vicious 
circle of erosion of supervisory effectiveness in those member states where money launder-
ers tend to concentrate their activity, which undermines the integrity of the entire European 
system. 
The imperative of establishing sound supervisory incentives to fight illicit finance 
effectively demands a stronger EU-level role in AML supervision. We recommend a unitary 
architecture centred on a new European AML Authority that would work on the basis of deep 
relationships with national authorities such as financial intelligence units and law enforce-
ment agencies. The new authority should have high standards of governance and independ-
ence, publish all its decisions and be empowered to impose sufficiently large fines to deter 
malpractice. It would also act as a catalyst for further EU harmonisation of the AML legal 
regime.
Policy Contribution 
Issue n˚19 | October 2018 A better European Union 
architecture to fight money 
laundering
Joshua Kirschenbaum and Nicolas Véron
2 Policy Contribution | Issue n˚19 | October 2018
1 Introduction
Tackling money laundering in the European Union has become more urgent in the wake of 
the US Treasury Department’s targeting of ABLV Bank in Latvia in February 2018, and follow-
ing a number of other high-profile cases of confirmed or alleged money laundering in large 
and small EU countries (Annex 1), and the 2015-16 disclosure of the so-called Panama Pa-
pers1. Tackling money laundering is also a sensitive issue for the euro area’s fledgling banking 
union because national AML supervisory failures result in reputational risk for the European 
Central Bank (ECB) in its new capacity of prudential supervisor. Current debates about AML 
policy also take place amid greater awareness in Europe of the linkage between illicit finance 
and security threats, not least the risk of interference by Russia and other third countries in 
EU domestic matters, and of the imperative for Europeans to have the capacity to address 
such threats credibly and autonomously if need be2. 
The ECB has made clear that it is not responsible for AML supervision under the existing 
legal framework, but it has also expressed its dissatisfaction with the status quo. In March 
2018, ECB Supervisory Board Chair Danièle Nouy said of the US Treasury Department’s AML 
intervention in relation to ABLV3 that it was “very embarrassing to depend on the United States 
to do the [AML] job. This has to change […] We need a European institution that is implement-
ing in a thorough, deep, consistent fashion this [AML] legislation in the euro area”4. In Septem-
ber, ECB Executive Board Member Benoit Coeuré said: “We support any initiative that leads 
to a more harmonised and more coordinated approach to anti-money laundering. Ideally this 
would be a single [AML supervisory] agency”5.
The international media has echoed these concerns. In March 2018, a Bloomberg View 
editorial argued that “responsibilities over money laundering should be handed to a Euro-
pean institution, and EU rules should be changed to give the ECB more freedom to promptly 
withdraw banking licenses”6. In July 2018, a Financial Times editorial titled ‘The EU is losing its 
battle against money laundering’ concluded that, until there is “political will” to “create a cen-
tralised European body for dealing with money laundering […], the international McMafia will 
continue to find plenty of ways to funnel its illicit billions through the pipework of the European 
financial system”7. Another Financial Times editorial, on 5 September 2018, was titled ‘EU 
needs a central body to stop money laundering’.
This Policy Contribution focuses primarily on the architecture for AML supervision in 
the European Union and its internal market. It is obvious, however, that even radical reform 
in that area should not be viewed as a panacea that that would address all the problems of 
Europe’s current AML policy. AML is difficult and will remain so. Even so, a better supervisory 
architecture could make a material difference and significantly enhance the effectiveness of 
the EU’s AML efforts. 
1 The Panama Papers, a set of millions of documents leaked in 2015 from the Panama-based law firm Mossack Fon-
seca, exposed the widespread use of anonymous companies and offshore bank accounts in furtherance of activity 
that may breach AML rules. 
2 The related challenge of combating the financing of terrorism (CFT), often paired with AML, eg in G20 discussions 
and largely reliant on the AML institutional infrastructure, is not separately covered in this paper. 
3 The US Treasury Department found under Section 311 of the US PATRIOT Act that ABLV was of “primary mon-
ey-laundering concern”. The bank went into voluntary liquidation shortly afterwards. See Annex 1.
4 Quoted from Ivan Camilleri, ‘Pilatus Bank incident ‘embarrassing’, says European Central Bank supervisor’, Times 
of Malta, 28 March 2018, and from European Parliament (2018b). The video of Ms Nouy’s 26 March hearing is 
available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ep-live/en/committees/video?event=20180326-1500-COMMIT-
TEE-ECON. 
5 Francesco Guarascio and Jan Strupczewski, ‘ECB’s Coeuré says EU should have agency to fight money laundering’, 
Reuters, 7 September 2018. 
6 Bloomberg Opinion Editorial Board, ‘Latvia’s ABLV Bank Has a Lesson for the ECB’, Bloomberg View, 19 March 
2018. 
7 Financial Times, ‘The EU is losing its battle against money laundering, 5 July 2018. 
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We start in the next section by briefly outlining the general features of AML policy, before 
summarising the current supervisory arrangements and ongoing policy developments in 
the EU (section 3). Section 4 describes the AML supervisory framework in the United States, 
which is doubly relevant to the EU debate, as both a significant comparison point and as a 
high-impact environmental factor – as illustrated by ABLV. Section 5 details the challenges 
faced by the EU’s current AML supervisory architecture and explores options to address 
them8.
2 AML: basic concepts 
Money laundering is the execution of a financial transaction involving the proceeds of a crim-
inal act with the intent to conceal the origin of the funds9. A common shorthand for the steps 
involved is ‘placement, layering, and integration,’ which refers to the injection of criminal 
proceeds into the financial system (placement), the transfer of those proceeds to obscure 
their origin (layering) and the successful investment, use, or withdrawal of the laundered 
money (integration). An AML regime is a set of rules requiring financial institutions or other 
entities to maintain controls and processes (an AML programme) to detect and report such 
activity, with the goal of enabling the government to discover, track, prevent or punish it. As 
a consequence, cases of AML violations may be disconnected from cases of actual money 
laundering. A bank’s failure to put adequate reporting systems in place, for example, might 
constitute a serious AML violation even in the absence of any criminal activity. Conversely, 
criminals might successfully launder money through a bank without the aid of a breakdown 
in the bank’s AML programme. Moreover, an AML supervisor imposing an administrative 
AML fine might not seek, or even be able, to determine that a bank actually facilitated the 
laundering of criminal proceeds. 
Countries began to establish AML regimes in the 1970s and 1980s to assist criminal 
investigations, largely related to the laundering of the cash proceeds of drug trafficking and 
other organised criminal activity10. Over time, the purpose and scope of AML regimes have 
evolved. With increased financial globalisation and unrestricted cross-border financial flows, 
AML regimes have shifted their focus from cash to electronic transactions. As the regimes 
themselves have become more sophisticated, criminals and their facilitators have responded, 
leading to an AML arms race between governments and criminals. The end of the Cold War 
and the lull in great-power conventional military conflicts led to an increased focus on uncon-
ventional security threats, including terrorist finance11, tax evasion, weapons proliferation, 
human trafficking, sanctions circumvention and kleptocracy. Governments now expect their 
AML regimes to help address all of these issues in a manner that was not foreseen fifty years 
ago, such that their scope is best described as countering all forms of illicit finance12.
8 This structure is intended to address the authors’ observation of significant unmet needs for mutual under-
standing in this area on both sides of the Atlantic. The inevitable consequence is that some parts of the paper’s 
argument will be of little information value to sections of its readership. Thus, section 2 is probably best skipped by 
AML experts in general, section 3 by EU banking experts, and section 4 by US AML or banking experts.
9 See eg the definitions by the Financial Action Task Force and the US Treasury, available respectively at http://www.
fatf-gafi.org/faq/moneylaundering/ and https://www.fincen.gov/history-anti-money-laundering-laws. 
10 The history of AML legislation in the United States since 1970 is developed on the US Financial Crimes Enforce-
ment Network website at https://www.fincen.gov/history-anti-money-laundering-laws. 
11 Although terrorist financing would typically make up a small percentage of illicit finance activity in most jurisdic-
tions, the 11 September 2001 attacks on the US galvanised the overhaul of AML regimes and increased the political 
salience of illicit finance. Efforts to combat terrorism in general and terrorist financing in particular draw on the 
financial information collected under AML regimes and combine it with other reporting streams, including intelli-
gence collection and law-enforcement investigations. 
12 Reuter and Truman (2004) review and critique the US and global AML frameworks as existed at that date. 
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Global standards for AML regimes were first formulated in 1989 following the creation of 
the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) at the G7 Summit in Paris13. Since then, FATF has set 
out 40 standards (‘recommendations’) that cover AML rules for financial and other entities to 
be enforced by public authorities, the proper criminalisation and prosecution of money laun-
dering, the creation of financial intelligence units and transparency steps such as the availa-
bility of information about the beneficial owners of legal entities and arrangements such as 
trusts14. FATF has 35 member countries, including the 15 pre-2004 EU member states, plus 
two regional members, the European Commission and the Gulf-Co-operation Council. Most 
of the world’s other jurisdictions are members of nine FATF-Style Regional Bodies (FSRBs), 
such as MONEYVAL for (mostly) eastern Europe, which includes the other 13 EU countries15. 
FATF and the FSRBs organise mutual evaluations of their member jurisdictions for compli-
ance with FATF recommendations. FATF also implements a process to identify jurisdictions 
with strategic AML (or CFT) deficiencies (greylisting) or those whose failure to address such 
deficiencies is ongoing and might require action by other members (blacklisting)16. 
The efforts of individual jurisdictions to combat money laundering rest on three pillars: 
• The first pillar consists of administrative authorities: AML supervisors. AML supervi-
sors examine entities for adherence to the jurisdiction’s AML regime and typically have 
the power to impose fines for non-compliance. These entities include banks and other 
financial firms but can also include casinos, precious metals dealers and – in the Euro-
pean Union – art dealers, lawyers and accountants. The United States puts less emphasis 
than the European Union on AML supervision of non-financial firms (see section 4). 
Correspondingly, the scope of entities subject to AML supervision is often referred to as 
“covered financial institutions” in the United States, while the European Union uses the 
broader expression “obliged entities”. As a result, several sector-specific AML supervisors 
coexist in most, though not all, jurisdictions17. In accordance with FATF recommenda-
tions, most AML regimes require obliged entities to maintain a risk-based AML pro-
gramme, meaning the extent of surveillance and controls over activity at the institution 
should be commensurate with the risk profiles of the various clients and lines of business. 
Such programmes oblige these entities to identify and perform due diligence on their 
customers, conduct transaction monitoring, retain and produce certain records and file 
suspicious activity reports18.
For obliged entities that are also subject to a prudential supervision regime, such as 
13 A permanent FATF Secretariat is hosted in Paris at the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD). 
14 The most recent set of FATF standards/recommendations was published in 2012 and is available at http://www.
fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/pdfs/FATF%20Recommendations%202012.pdf. In addition, 
FATF has issued nine special recommendations focused on combating the financing of terrorism. 
15 MONEYVAL, or the Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financ-
ing of Terrorism, is a permanent body of the Council of Europe that was established (under a different name) in 
1997. It includes 25 countries in central, eastern and southeastern Europe and the Caucasus (including Moldova, 
Russia and Ukraine), plus nine small western European jurisdictions (Andorra, Gibraltar, Guernsey, Jersey, Liech-
tenstein, the Isle of Man, Monaco, San Marino and the Vatican). The European Commission and Secretariat-Gen-
eral of the Council have observer status. More detail is at https://www.coe.int/en/web/moneyval/moneyval-brief. 
A list of all FSRBs and their membership is available on the FATF website at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/countries/.
16 As of end-September 2018, there were eight greylisted jurisdictions (Ethiopia, Pakistan, Serbia, Sri Lanka, Syria, 
Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia and Yemen) and two blacklisted ones (Iran and North Korea; see http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/countries/#high-risk). 
17 In the United States, FinCEN is the sole AML supervisor in principle, but in practice it delegates many of the tasks 
to other agencies (see section 4). Some EU jurisdictions also have a single AML supervisor (section 3).
18 In the United States, the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (which brings together various super-
visors) maintains a Bank Secrecy Act/AML Examination Manual, available at https://www.ffiec.gov/bsa_aml_in-
fobase/pages_manual/manual_online.htm. The closest equivalent at the EU level is the AML/CFT Guidelines 
published by the ESAs Joint Committee in June 2017, available at https://www.eba.europa.eu/-/esas-publish-aml-
cft-guidelines. There are also national guidelines/manuals in individual EU member states.
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banks, there are synergies between prudential supervision and AML supervision. In many 
jurisdictions, the two functions are performed by the same supervisory institution. Even 
when that is not the case, prudential supervisors rely on AML supervisors for informa-
tion that is relevant to their authorisation and review processes, and conversely, AML 
supervisors often delegate supervisory tasks to prudential authorities. But there are also 
significant differences in terms of supervisory arrangements, culture and practices. One 
example is in the approach to cross-border activities. While the prudential supervision of 
banks’ foreign branches is (under the Basel Concordat and subsequent legislation in indi-
vidual jurisdictions) the responsibility of home supervisors (ie those of the parent bank’s 
country), the AML supervision of bank branches is a matter for host-country authorities, 
even as the home supervisor has responsibility for the bank’s overall governance and risk 
controls. 
• The second pillar consists of Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs), which collect, analyse 
and disseminate the reporting submitted by obliged entities under applicable AML 
programme requirements. There is only one FIU for each jurisdiction. Their organisation-
al setups are not uniform, however: FIUs may be units of administrative agencies, law 
enforcement bodies or the judiciary, or even stand-alone agencies of their own. FIUs aim 
to support the activities of AML supervisors and law enforcement agencies. They partic-
ipate in a dedicated global body, the Egmont Group19. Facilitated by Egmont, FIUs share 
financial intelligence with their foreign counterparts, either proactively or upon request. 
The bar for such sharing is lower than the threshold necessary to obtain evidence for trial 
under a mutual legal assistance treaty request20. 
• The third pillar consists of law enforcement agencies and the justice system. They are 
responsible for the investigation and prosecution of individuals and entities that commit 
criminal violations related to money laundering. Such violations most often take one of 
two forms. The first is the traditional criminal offense that most people think of in con-
nection to money laundering. In many jurisdictions, criminal money laundering charges 
require prosecutors to prove that the accused knowingly conducted a transaction with 
funds derived from criminal proceeds, ie that an underlying crime, known as a ‘predicate 
offence’, occurred21. Although it can be brought as a standalone charge, money laundering 
is often appended to charges related to the predicate offence itself. The second type of 
offence that can be criminally prosecuted is the intentional violation of AML programme 
requirements by an obliged entity or its officers, a charge that prosecutors must prove in 
court using a criminal standard of evidence. 
This global framework for AML has grown organically. It has attracted criticism, for 
example, for causing certain categories of stakeholders to be cut off from access to banking or 
remittance services, a theme often referred to as ‘de-risking’ (eg Global Centre on Cooperative 
19 The Egmont Group of FIUs was formed in 1995 at a meeting that took place at the Egmont Palace in Brussels, thus 
its name. It established a permanent secretariat in Toronto in 2008. Among its 156 members are the FIUs of all EU 
member states and also those of Andorra, Anguilla, Aruba, Bermuda, the British Virgin Islands, Iceland, Jersey, 
Guernsey, Liechtenstein, the Isle of Man, Monaco, Norway, San Marino, Sint Maarten, Switzerland and the Vati-
can. 
20 The lack of a similar channel to facilitate the direct sharing of information between AML supervisors is a significant 
gap in the current global framework to combat money laundering.
21 See for example, for the United States, Section 2101 of the Department of Justice (DOJ) U.S. Attorneys’ Manual, 
available at https://www.justice.gov/usam/criminal-resource-manual-2101-money-laundering-overview, and the 
DOJ’s Money Laundering and Asset Recovery Section, available at https://www.justice.gov/criminal-mlars. In 
many countries, prosecutors or investigative judges can also pursue asset forfeitures (seizure or confiscation of 
assets by public authorities) as part of money laundering proceedings, although asset forfeitures are not limited 
to financial crimes. In the EU, a draft directive on the criminalisation of money laundering (COM(2016) 826 pub-
lished on 21 December 2016 and expected, at time of writing, to be enacted and published shortly) opens up the 
possibility of prosecution for money laundering without proving a predicate offence to a criminal standard, as is 
already the case in, for example, Sweden. 
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Security and Oxfam, 2015). Others have criticised contemporary AML for in effect passing on 
policing responsibilities to financial institutions. However, we take the framework as it is and 
do not attempt to address those fundamental critiques, focusing instead on how the EU can 
improve its framework. 
3 Current supervisory framework and AML 
policy developments in the EU
Ten years ago, the EU financial services (including AML) policy framework consisted of 
legislation that was partly harmonised at EU level and enforced almost exclusively at na-
tional level. This landscape has undergone radical changes in the past decade. The resulting 
structure is extremely complex, with an awkward coexistence of national and supranational 
features, many new and untested aspects, and widespread expectations of more change to 
come in the near future. Box 1 gives an overview of the structure of EU financial regulation 
and supervision.
Box 1: EU financial legislation, regulation and supervision
EU laws can be ‘directives’, framework laws that demand additional legislation (‘transposi-
tion’) in each member state, or ‘regulations’ – laws that are directly applicable in all member 
states with no need for national transposition. ‘Maximum harmonisation’, or the establish-
ment of identical legislative arrangements in all EU countries (as opposed to minimum 
standards or ‘minimum harmonisation’), is most easily achieved through regulations, even 
though these might also leave flexibility to member states on how to implement them. In 
terms of financial services laws, most (though not all22) EU directives and regulations are 
based on Article 114 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), which 
forms the basis for all European single market laws. Such laws are always initially proposed 
by the European Commission, then negotiated by the Council of the EU (composed of 
representatives from all member states) and the European Parliament (whose members 
are elected by universal suffrage to a five-year term)23. Confusingly, what are known in the 
United States (and in many EU member states) as regulations, ie rules issued by adminis-
trative agencies under a general framework established by laws, are referred to as ‘binding 
technical standards’ when issued at the EU level, typically by the European Commission 
upon the proposal of the relevant European supervisory authority24. 
The ‘Single Rulebook’ is a non-legal expression that refers to the aim of maximum har-
monisation in EU financial services rulemaking, or to the subset of applicable rules which is 
maximally harmonised. An example of the Single Rulebook is the Capital Requirement Regu-
lation (Regulation No. 575/2013), enacted in 2013 on the basis of the Basel III Accord of 2010, 
22 A significant exception is the SSM Regulation of 2013, which is based on Article 127(6) TFEU and had thus to be 
adopted by unanimous vote of the member states with only a consultative role for the European Parliament.
23 The Council of the EU, or the Council, and the European Parliament are together known in EU-speak as the 
co-legislators. The Council is not to be confused with the European Council, which refers to meetings of the EU 
member states’ heads of state and government to provide policy direction but without formal involvement in the 
EU legislative process, or with the Council of Europe, which is a human rights organisation not directly related to 
the European Union and with a significantly broader geographical scope and membership.
24 An exception is ECB rules that are also known as ECB Regulations. The ESAs also issue documents known as reg-
ulatory guidelines and recommendations, which are generally observed by market participants but are not legally 
binding. 
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that sets largely uniform capital requirements for banks throughout the European Union with 
a transition period that expires in January 2019. The expression Single Rulebook was coined in 
a landmark report by a task force led by former central banker Jacques de Larosière in 2008-
09 (European Commission, 2009). The Larosière Report also set the basis for the creation of 
three so-called European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) that help to coordinate financial 
regulation and supervision in the European Union: the European Banking Authority (EBA) 
in London (which will move to Paris because of Brexit), the European Insurance and Occu-
pational Pensions Authority (EIOPA) in Frankfurt, and the European Securities and Markets 
Authority (ESMA) in Paris25. All three were established on 1 January 2011. The banking union, 
currently consisting of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM)26 and the Single Resolution 
Mechanism (SRM), was initiated in mid-2012 and entered into full force in November 2014 
(SSM) and January 2016 (SRM). Draft legislation proposed by the European Commission, but 
not at the time of writing adopted by the co-legislators, includes a November 2015 proposal 
for a European Deposit Insurance Scheme, which if adopted would represent a significant 
step towards completing the banking union, and a September 2017 proposal for significant 
reform of the ESAs (‘ESAs Review’). 
The geographical scope of the ESAs’ authority is the entire European single market, in-
cluding the 28 EU member states and other members of the European Economic Area (EEA), 
namely Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway27. By contrast, the geographical scope of the bank-
ing union, and thus of the SSM and SRM, is currently limited to the 19 euro-area countries. 
It might expand in the future through the process of ‘close cooperation’ that allows non-euro 
member states to join the banking union voluntarily28. 
The banking union for prudential supervision of banks
The founding legislative basis of the banking union, the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) 
Regulation of 2013, stipulated the transfer of all bank licensing authority in the euro area from 
national banking supervisors to the Frankfurt-based European Central Bank29. In principle, 
ECB prudential supervisory decisions are made (like other ECB decisions) by the Governing 
Council, the ECB’s highest body, but in practice the central decision-maker is the SSM Su-
pervisory Board, an internal body of the ECB, whose decisions the Governing Council almost 
never declines to endorse. 
The SSM Regulation introduced a major distinction between banks or banking groups 
deemed Significant Institutions (SIs), for which the ECB has sole prudential supervisory 
25 Contrary to what their name suggests, the ESAs currently do not have direct supervisory authority over financial 
firms for either prudential or AML purposes. ESMA alone has direct conduct-of-business supervisory authority 
over some firms (see section 5). All three ESAs have the authority to impose direct decisions on financial firms in 
special circumstances such as emergency, which have however never been invoked yet since the ESAs’ establish-
ment in 2011. 
26 As explained below, the supervisory authority of the SSM extends only to bank prudential matters and does not 
cover the AML supervision of banks. 
27 Some territories and dependencies of EU or EEA member states, for example Jersey or Svalbard, are outside 
of single market, even though they might benefit from special ad-hoc arrangements. The four other sovereign 
microstates of Western Europe (Andorra, Monaco, San Marino and the Vatican) are similarly outside of the single 
market. Gibraltar has special arrangements which make it for most practical purposes a participant in the single 
market. Switzerland is not in the single market for financial services. At the time of writing, it remains to be deter-
mined whether the UK will leave the single market, and if so, when. 
28 Bulgaria is expected to enter close cooperation in mid-2019 as part of a process to eventually join the euro area. 
Several other non-euro countries are at various early stages of consideration or preparation of close cooperation. 
29 This framework is in some respects more centralised than in the United States, where many banks operate on a 
state license (or charter) not a federal one – see section 4. A minor exception to the ECB monopoly of bank licens-
ing is for euro-area branches of banks domiciled in non-EEA countries, the licensing of which remains the respon-
sibility of national authorities. Unlike subsidiaries, such branches do not benefit from a single market passport.
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authority, and (generally smaller) Less Significant Institutions (LSIs), the day-to-day super-
vision of which remains at the national level. SIs include all banks above €30 billion in total 
assets, plus others according to certain additional criteria30. There were 116 SIs and slightly 
fewer than 3,000 LSIs as of mid-201831. As of end-2017, SIs represented about 81.5 percent of 
the system’s total assets (ECB, 2018a). Ninety-one of the 116 SIs were banking groups head-
quartered in the euro area, while the other 25 were euro-area operations of banking groups 
headquartered elsewhere32.
For SIs, while the ECB has sole prudential supervisory authority, relevant national agen-
cies, referred to as National Competent Authorities (NCAs)33, also participate in the process 
through Joint Supervisory Teams (JSTs). A JST brings together supervisory staff at the ECB in 
Frankfurt (up to a dozen for the largest banks) together with staff from the NCAs of the coun-
tries where the supervised banking group has significant operations. The JST is led at the ECB 
by a JST coordinator (functionally equivalent to a Central Point of Contact in the US Federal 
Reserve system), while each NCA’s staff group within the JST is led by a JST sub-coordinator. 
The coordinator and sub-coordinators prepare supervisory decisions together; in case of 
disagreement, the decision proposal is made by the coordinator alone, with mention of the 
dissenting opinion(s). 
For LSIs, day-to-day prudential supervisory decisions are made by the relevant NCA, 
including setting regulatory requirements, assessing the bank’s soundness and vetting 
of management and supervisory board appointments to ensure that all banks’ key deci-
sion-makers are fit and proper (F&P). By contrast, common procedures apply to authorisa-
tion processes in which decisions are made by the ECB for LSIs and SIs alike. These common 
procedures include decisions on bank licensing (including issuance of new licenses and the 
withdrawal of existing ones) and the vetting of acquisitions of qualifying holdings (ie changes 
in ownership that may influence the bank’s governance and control). The NCAs’ day-to-day 
prudential supervision of LSIs is subject to the ECB’s formal processes of supervisory over-
sight, sometimes referred to as indirect supervision. 
In non-euro-area member states, all prudential supervisory tasks are carried out by the 
relevant NCA, eg the UK Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) which is itself controlled by 
the Bank of England. The EBA has authority to foster supervisory coordination and con-
vergence, in addition to its role in the preparation of EU banking legislation and binding 
technical standards. For example, the EBA is the central coordinator and publisher of regular 
pan-European stress testing exercises, which are conducted by the SSM (in the euro area) and 
NCAs (elsewhere in the Internal Market).
The other existing pillar of the banking union, the SRM, is not detailed here as it has no 
direct role in the AML framework.
AML rules and enforcement framework
EU legislation on AML was first initiated in the early 1990s, following AML developments in 
individual member states. To date, there have been five successive AML Directives (AMLDs)34. 
30 Thus, for example, ABLV was a SI before its liquidation, despite having only €3.6 billion in total assets, because it 
was one of the three largest banks headquartered in Latvia. 
31 ECB (2018b) lists 119 SIs, but three of these are cases of double-counting, namely Slovakian subsidiaries of bank-
ing groups headquartered elsewhere in the euro area. 
32 In 19 of these 25 cases, the parent group was headquartered in another European internal market country (Nor-
way, Sweden and UK; the listing predates the move of Nordea’s headquarters from Stockholm to Helsinki). The 
remaining six were controlled, respectively, by Citi, JP Morgan, Bank of New York Mellon, State Street, Russia’s VTB 
and Venezuela’s Banesco. This latter group is expected to expand because of Brexit.
33 Depending on the euro-area country, the NCA for prudential banking supervision is either the national central 
bank, eg in Italy or the Netherlands, or a specialised agency, eg in Finland or Germany. 
34 Namely, AMLD of 1991 (91/308/EEC, amended by AMLD2 and repealed by AMLD3); AMLD2 of 2001 (2001/97/
EC, repealed by AMLD3); AMLD3 of 2005 (2005/60/EC, repealed by AMLD4); AMLD4 of 2015 ((EU)2015/849); 
and AMLD5 of May 2018 ((EU)2018/843). Other acts of EU legislation are relevant for AML, for example the Fund 
Transfer Regulation of 2015 ((EU)2015/847). 
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AMLD4 has been in force since June 2015 with a deadline for transposition by member states 
of 26 June 201735. The deadline for transposition of most of AMLD5 is 10 January 2020. The 
successive AMLDs have generally followed (or even exceeded) FATF recommendations and 
expanded the scope of obliged entities subject to AML supervision, tightened the definitions 
of suspicious activities and the processes to identify and report them, put gradually greater 
emphasis on ultimate beneficial ownership and risk-based approaches, and lifted obstacles 
that prevented communication between relevant authorities36. 
AML supervision in EU member states is conducted by a wide range of national authori-
ties. Annex 2 lists individual countries’ FIUs and authorities responsible for the AML super-
vision of banks (the AML supervisors of non-bank obliged entities are not listed). As this list 
illustrates, EU member states exhibit many different combinations, typically inherited from 
complex histories. Depending on the country, the FIU may be part of the finance ministry, the 
central bank, the national police, the interior ministry, the prosecutorial service, the customs 
service, the justice ministry or could be a dedicated independent agency with its own gov-
ernance and accountability framework. The AML supervisor of banks is generally the same 
as their prudential supervisor, but this is not universally the case. In the UK the AML super-
visor is the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), and in Malta, Poland, and Spain, the AML 
supervisor is the FIU even though it may delegate certain tasks to the prudential supervisor. 
In keeping with the global practice, and unlike in prudential supervision, AML supervisors in 
the EU are responsible for both domestic banks and branches of non-domestic institutions, 
which can introduce complications if the supervisor of the parent is not aware of goings-on at 
the branch. 
The EBA oversees member states’ AML supervision of banks much as it does their pru-
dential supervision. In particular, under Article 17 of its eponymous Regulation, the EBA may 
investigate cases of “breaches of Union law” and even in some circumstances override indi-
vidual decisions of national authorities. This, however, can typically only happen after a large-
scale (prudential or AML) supervisory failure and not more proactively, which is why the EBA 
has described its breach-of-Union-law powers as “a rather blunt tool” (European Parliament, 
2018a). The EBA’s first-ever finding of breach of Union law for AML matters was reported in its 
recommendation to the Maltese FIU following the case of Pilatus Bank, published in July 2018 
(EBA, 2018b). Ongoing investigations are underway at time of writing in Denmark, Estonia, 
and Latvia (Annex 1). EIOPA and ESMA (see Box 1) have similar mandates to foster supervi-
sory convergence in their respective (non-bank) sectors. The Joint Committee that facilitates 
coordination among the three ESAs has an AML sub-committee, known as AMLC37. 
Other EU institutions also play a role. A computer network known as FIU.net was devel-
oped in the 2000s following a Council decision in 200038, and in 2016 was integrated into 
the EU Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation, known as Europol. According to Europol, 
“FIU.net is designed to facilitate the highly secure connections required for these exchanges of 
information [among FIUs]”39. The European Commission and EBA have explored ways to 
further improve cooperation between EU FIUs, including the establishment in 2006 of the EU 
35 As of July 2018, at least six member states (Greece, Ireland, Latvia, Malta, Romania and Spain) had failed to fully 
transpose the AMLD4. See European Commission press release, ‘Infringements: Commission refers Greece, 
Ireland and Romania to the Court of Justice for not implementing anti-money laundering rules’, available at http://
europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-4491_en.htm. 
36 The European Commission (2018) observed, however, that even if the changes associated with the future imple-
mentation of AMLD5 are factored in, “Cooperation between prudential authorities and AML supervisors is also 
largely dependent on the good faith and willingness of the relevant authorities.”
37 A description of AMLC is at https://esas-joint-committee.europa.eu/Pages/Activities/Anti-Money-Laundering-Ob-
jectives-and-Tasks.aspx. 
38	 ‘Council	Decision	of	17	October	2000	concerning	arrangements	for	cooperation	between	financial	intelligence	units	of	the	
Member	States	in	respect	of	exchanging	information’,	available	at	https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PD-
F/?uri=CELEX:32000D0642&from=EN.
39 Source: Europol’s website at https://www.europol.europa.eu/about-europol/financial-intelligence-units-fiu-net. 
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FIUs’ Platform, an informal group that supports occasional projects40. The European Union’s 
Judicial Cooperation Unit, known as Eurojust and established in 2002, works to coordinate 
criminal investigations and prosecutions of cross-border crimes in the European Union, 
including money laundering cases. Eurojust, however, has no autonomous powers to investi-
gate or prosecute. 
Recent policy developments
In May 2018, the European Commission initiated joint work on AML reform with the ECB 
and the three ESAs41. The first outcome of this work was a reflection paper sent to member 
states in late August 2018. This paper has not been made public by the EU institutions, but its 
text was commented on in the media42 and later posted online by a member of the European 
Parliament43. 
On 12 September 2018, in his yearly State of the European Union address, European 
Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker announced new measures to reinforce the 
effectiveness of AML enforcement, and the European Commission on the same day published 
proposals for corresponding amendments to the ESAs Review legislation. If adopted, these 
amendments would, among other things, confer on the EBA additional authority to request 
that national AML supervisors investigate potential breaches and consider actions, and in 
extreme cases of non-compliance by the national authority, to impose some direct decisions 
(though not fines) on individual firms. It would also empower the EBA to carry out periodic 
independent reviews of AML issues and risk assessment exercises and to collect data on 
AML supervision in the European Union (European Commission, 2018). Unlike existing EBA 
competencies, this new authority would extend beyond the banking sector to other categories 
of supervised financial firms. This would effectively deprive EIOPA and ESMA of their existing 
AML roles, and as a consequence, the AMLC would be integrated into the EBA. As with the 
rest of the ESAs Review, however, the likelihood of adoption of these amendments before the 
end of the current EU parliamentary term in the spring of 2019 is hard to assess at the time of 
writing. 
European AML in practice
AML enforcement in the European Union is extremely heterogeneous. It is also impossible 
to observe comprehensively from publicly available information sources, because disclosure 
practices vary considerably from one national authority to another44. For example, AML fines 
have so far either been entirely anonymised or not published at all in Denmark, Germany 
and Spain. In France, Sweden and the UK, by contrast, fines are published and their subjects 
identified in most or all cases45. Even in the latter circumstance, however, the publication for-
mat has often made it difficult or impossible to understand the exact nature of the violations, 
and thus to assess their seriousness, and, as a consequence, the punitive or deterrent impact 
of a given fine. In principle, Article 60 of AMLD4 mandates member states to publish most 
40 See European Commission (2017), section 2.2.4. and accompanying staff working document, and EU FIUs’ Plat-
form (2016), the final report of an extensive collaborative study.
41 The letter of 8 May 2018 establishing this work process was signed jointly by the Commission’s First Vice-President 
Frans Timmermans, Vice-President Valdis Dombrovskis and Commissioner Vera Jourova. It refers to “a number of 
high profile incidents in recent months” as a reason for the endeavour. It was published by Politico and is available 
at https://www.politico.eu/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Letter-to-SSM-EBA-EIOPA-and-ESMA_signed.pdf. 
42 Jim Brunsden, Caroline Binham, and Claire Jones, ‘Scandals expose weakness of EU’s dirty money fight, say 
watchdogs’, Financial Times, 5 September 2018. 
43 Available at https://sven-giegold.de/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/COM-Reflection-paper-on-ele-
ments-of-a-Roadmap-for-seamless-cooperation_Sept-2018.pdf.
44 A number of quantitative indicators were collected on an EU-wide comparative basis and published in the final 
report of the European Commission-sponsored ECOLEF Project five years ago (Unger, 2013). 
45 Some countries, such as France, have exceptions in case of a perceived threat to financial stability or of dispropor-
tionate impact to the fined entity in case of disclosure. 
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decisions including the identity of the affected person or entity and the nature of the breach46, 
but it is not clear that all member states comply with this requirement, and the deadline for 
transposition (June 2017) is too recent for a firm assessment. From discussions with practi-
tioners conducted for this paper, the UK FCA appears to have a reputation for imposing high-
er fines for AML violations than most other national authorities, even as fines are often much 
higher still in the United States47. Among other EU member states, interviewees mention Italy 
and Germany as imposing very low fines for AML violations, whereas France is somewhere 
in between. Mutual evaluation reports published by FATF and MONEYVAL provide some 
qualitative detail but do not allow for a comprehensive comparison of AML enforcement and 
its effectiveness across EU/EEA member states. 
Recent cases for which some information is publicly available are summarised in Annex 
1. Many of these events occurred in smaller euro-area countries, where resources for supervi-
sory oversight are typically constrained. There are two important caveats, though, that suggest 
caution about causality in that observation. First, major money laundering incidents at EU 
banks have not been limited to smaller jurisdictions and have also occurred in major financial 
centres such as London. Second, it is intrinsically hard to ascertain whether more publicised 
cases of prominent money laundering reflect a greater frequency of money laundering in a 
given jurisdiction, or, conversely, a greater willingness on the part of the jurisdiction’s author-
ities to root out problems and tackle illicit activity – or both.
4 AML in the United States
The AML regime in the United States is based on a body of laws referred to as the Bank Se-
crecy Act (BSA), which is found in Titles 12 and 31 of the country’s code of federal laws (the 
United States Code or USC) and further implemented via regulations in Title 31 of the Code of 
Federal Regulations (CFR)48. 
The US Treasury Department has the authority to administer the BSA and delegates that 
authority to the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), a bureau within Treasury, 
by Treasury Order 180-01. FinCEN is both the AML supervisor in the United States – setting 
rules for financial institutions, providing interpretive guidance and issuing penalties – and the 
country’s FIU, supporting law enforcement and other regulators49. 
As of 2013, FinCEN directly employed approximately 340 people (Shasky Calvery, 2013). 
Most of these personnel are devoted to its financial intelligence analysis, policymaking and 
technology functions, rather than to enforcement and supervision. 
FinCEN relies on other federal financial supervisors50, which are much larger organi-
sations and to which FinCEN has delegated its AML supervisory authority, for the efficient 
examination of most covered financial institutions51. With respect to AML supervision of the 
46 Article 60 of AMLD4 also has exceptions in case of disproportionate impact or financial stability risk. 
47 Very recently, the Dutch central bank has also moved to impose large fines as documented in Annex 1. Article 59 of 
AMLD4 raised and harmonised the maximum amount of AML fines to “at least €5 million or 10 percent of the total 
annual turnover” of the affected entity. As with publicity of decisions, however, it is too soon to assess the extent to 
which this new legislation has fostered convergence of actual behaviour of national AML supervisors. 
48 The relevant statutory framework is found at 12 USC 1829, 12 USC 1951-1959 and 31 USC 5311-5314, 5316-5332. 
The implementing regulations are codified at 31 CFR Chapter X. 
49 FinCEN programmes are detailed at https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/shared/Appendix_A.pdf. 
50 Throughout this section, we adopt the European habit of referring to authorities that supervise financial institu-
tions as ‘supervisors’ rather than ‘regulators’, even though the latter term is also commonly used in the United 
States. Specifically, a bank’s prudential supervisor at the federal level is called its Primary Federal Regulator. 
51 There does not appear to be a specific headcount of the staff that focuses on AML tasks within these supervisory 
agencies. 
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banking sector alone, these agencies include the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 
(OCC), the Federal Reserve System, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and 
the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA). The OCC supervises federally (or nation-
ally) chartered banks, many of which are also members of the Federal Reserve System. The 
Federal Reserve System supervises its member banks that are state-chartered, and other 
entities such as bank holding companies52 and foreign banking organisations. The FDIC is 
the federal supervisor of state-chartered banks that are not members of the Federal Reserve 
System, typically the smaller ones, and insures all bank deposits, which entails special 
(backup) supervisory authority over all banks. The NCUA is the supervisor of credit unions 
and insures their deposits53. The responsibility for the issuance and revocation of banking 
licenses, F&P checks of management and board members, and review of ownership changes, 
either belongs to one of these federal supervisors or (for state-chartered banks) to the relevant 
state-level supervisor, or both54.
The US system of AML supervision, then, is a complex patchwork that developed organ-
ically and has not been streamlined. This has advantages and disadvantages. On the nega-
tive side, there are multiple oversight authorities, none of which has the complete picture 
of operations inside a large financial institution, and coordination among agencies can be 
cumbersome. In a big universal bank (ie diversified banking group), the depository bank is 
typically chartered and supervised by the OCC; large portions of business activity, including 
investment banking and securities and derivatives trading, are under the jurisdiction of the 
Securities and Exchange Commission, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission and 
their associated self-regulatory organisations, the Financial Industry Regulation Authority 
(FINRA) and the National Futures Association (NFA); and the holding company is supervised 
by the Federal Reserve55. The OCC would not necessarily be able to identify AML violations 
across non-bank business lines, but neither might the Federal Reserve. When penalties are 
imposed on a bank for serious AML violations, the OCC, the Federal Reserve, FinCEN and 
(if the violations rise to a criminal level) the Department of Justice might all be involved. 
This is not to mention the ability of state-level banking supervisors or prosecutors to join in, 
particularly the New York State Department of Financial Services. Moreover, while FINRA and 
the NFA are professional and competent, a private-sector self-regulatory organisation simply 
cannot fill the shoes of an actual government agency, and neither should it be expected to 
adopt the same enforcement posture. 
One idea to untangle this jumble was proposed by FinCEN’s former Chief Counsel, Carl-
ton Greene, in April 2018 in testimony to the US House of Representatives Financial Services 
Committee. Greene (2018) called for a solution:
52 In US financial parlance, ‘banks’ generally refers to individual deposit-taking (depository) institutions, whereas 
bank holding companies are the consolidating entities of banking groups that may also include other (non-bank) 
activities, such as securities trading, investment banking or asset management. By contrast, banks and banking 
groups are often confused in EU financial discussions. This is partly linked to history, as many European countries 
have long relied on ‘universal’ banks, whereas in the United States, banks for many decades could not undertake 
many non-bank financial activities under the Glass-Steagall legislation of 1933.
53 Credit unions are financial cooperatives that are a separate category from banks under US law, but are similar to 
Europe’s cooperative banks.
54 Outside the banking sector, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) supervises securities firms (among 
others), and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) supervises futures commission merchants trad-
ing in derivatives. Both in turn delegate a substantial portion of their supervisory responsibility, including certain 
AML examinations, to their affiliated self-regulatory organisations. Kirschenbaum (2018d) explores the challenges 
of AML supervision of non-bank firms in the context of the United States.
55 The Federal Reserve Board delegates the corresponding supervisory tasks to the Federal Reserve Bank of the 
region where the relevant entity is registered. There are 12 regional Federal Reserve Banks covering the entire ter-
ritory of the United States. Unlike those of national authorities in the European Union, the geographic boundaries 
of US Federal Reserve Districts typically do not coincide with state borders – for example, the state of Missouri is 
home to two different regional Federal Reserve Banks, respectively in Kansas City and Saint Louis.
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“that includes closer collaboration between FinCEN and the federal functional regula-
tors and greater authority for FinCEN to establish BSA examination and enforcement 
priorities across these agencies and similarly to control interpretations of BSA rules. 
FinCEN, by design, is uniquely positioned to understand the threats posed by illicit 
finance and to understand the regulatory trade-offs needed to address those threats. In 
addition to the benefits to FinCEN’s mission, such an approach also could substantially 
lessen the burdens for regulated financial institutions, and give them greater freedom to 
innovate and partner with FinCEN to find better solutions to illicit finance threats”.
This more centralised approach would require the allocation of additional resources and 
personnel to FinCEN.  
Two other structural weaknesses in the US AML regime – on which the European Union 
has made much more progress – are, first, the lack of beneficial ownership information for 
legal entities, which is complicated in the United States by the fact that companies are formed 
at the state rather than national level; and, second, the lack of AML programme requirements 
for managers of private investment funds such as hedge funds and private equity firms, and 
for intermediaries or professional service providers such as accountants, lawyers and real-es-
tate agents.  
The US does however have experienced, competent and well-resourced regulatory and 
law enforcement agencies with track records of aggressive enforcement and large fines. The 
US government history of imposing fines of hundreds of millions and even billions of dollars 
for AML and sanctions violations is singular56. And while prosecutions of bankers and other 
sophisticated financial facilitators for criminal money laundering under the relevant statutes57 
are rare58, and financial crime cases difficult to prove, the possibility that law enforcement and 
prosecutors will secure a conviction and serious prison time is more tangible in the United 
States than in many other countries. The United States tends to make up for certain structural 
weaknesses with more active enforcement. Another advantage is the membership of the 
Treasury Department, through its Office of Intelligence and Analysis, of the US Intelligence 
Community59.  
The United States also enjoys access to a powerful weapon in its AML arsenal – Section 311 
of the PATRIOT Act60. Title III of this contains numerous changes to the Bank Secrecy Act. The 
US Congress enacted this legislation in the wake of the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. 
The Section 311 authority, which the Treasury Department has delegated to FinCEN, enables 
the US government to target administratively foreign financial institutions that it determines 
are “of primary money laundering concern” (an undefined term). It can condition, restrict or 
cut off those institutions’ access to the US financial system, including prohibiting the pro-
56 In 2018, US Bancorp was fined over $600 million for AML violations, and Rabobank was fined nearly $370 million. 
JPMorgan in 2014 was assessed AML penalties in excess of $800 million. HSBC paid $665 million for AML viola-
tions in 2012. The announcements are available on the Department of Justice’s website, respectively at https://
www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/manhattan-us-attorney-announces-criminal-charges-against-us-bancorp-viola-
tions-bank, https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/rabobank-na-pleads-guilty-agrees-pay-over-360-million, https://www.
justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/manhattan-us-attorney-and-fbi-assistant-director-charge-announce-filing-criminal, and 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/hsbc-holdings-plc-and-hsbc-bank-usa-na-admit-anti-money-laundering-and-
sanctions-violations.
57 18 USC §§ 1956 & 1957.
58 Though not unheard of, such as a Miami-based Venezuelan corruption case in which the Justice Department 
secured a banker’s guilty plea in August of 2018. See https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/former-swiss-bank-execu-
tive-pleads-guilty-role-billion-dollar-international-money-laundering. In addition to the federal Title 18 violation, 
money laundering is also criminalised at the state level.
59 The US Intelligence Community is a formal grouping of US government agencies with intelligence functions. In 
relation to the US Treasury Department, see https://www.treasury.gov/about/organizational-structure/offices/Pag-
es/Office-of-Intelligence-Analysis.aspx.
60 Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act amended the Bank Secrecy Act by creating a new Section 5318A of Title 31 of 
the US Code.
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vision of US correspondent accounts, effectively ending their ability to make international 
payments cleared in dollars. In recent years, FinCEN has targeted banks in three European 
countries: Andorra, Cyprus and Latvia61.
5  Challenges and options to improve the EU 
framework
A broad-based perception has crystallised since the ABLV case erupted in February 2018 that 
the European Union has an AML problem (see section 1 and Annex 1). A surge of head-
line-grabbing cases has entrenched the narrative that, in the words of a prominent commen-
tator, “EU banks have become a money launderer’s dream”62. 
Pinpointing Europe’s AML supervisory problem
Given the difficulty of observing and quantifying money laundering, it is not self-evident that 
malpractice has actually become more widespread in recent years. It is also possible that 
acceptance of it has decreased. Factors that might have led to heightened AML awareness in 
Europe include:
• An assertive recent stance from the United States, as illustrated by the ABLV case;
• An erosion of the perception of structural alignment between EU and US interests and a 
correspondingly rising perception of the need for Europe to develop its own capacity to 
identify threats and ensure its security;
• A greater sensitivity of the European Union and many of its member states to risks ema-
nating from Russia;
• Improvements brought about by the implementation of AMLD4; and
• The emergence of dedicated European authorities with a mandate to oversee banking 
practices: first the EBA in 2011 and especially the SSM in 2014.
The last of these might have reduced overall European tolerance of supervisory failures, 
in contrast to an earlier era in which all relevant authorities were national and many were 
inclined to defend national banking champions.  Irrespective of whether the problem is 
growing or not, it is evident that recent AML supervision in the EU has been embarrassingly 
ineffective, and that deep reform thus needs to be considered. 
The core problem is one of supervisory incentives and of supervisory architecture. It 
results from the coexistence of an integrated, enforceable single financial market policy with 
the national structures of AML supervision. As a consequence, AML supervisory weakness in 
any one EU/EEA member state leads to that country becoming attractive for money launder-
ers who can use it for access to the entire single market. This, in turns, creates a constituency 
in the country against forceful AML enforcement, bringing together the criminals and their 
representatives, an array of service providers, and potentially also government authorities 
that have failed in their past AML supervisory duties. If sufficiently large, this aggregate 
constituency might weigh on national political processes and outcomes, even in cases that 
stop short of outright government capture. The resulting pressures further weaken the AML 
supervisory framework. In sum, the combination of EU/EEA single market and national AML 
61 These cases, and more in other parts of the world, are listed on FinCEN’s website at https://www.fincen.gov/re-
sources/statutes-and-regulations/311-special-measures. Zarate (2013) provides narrative detail about the creation 
and early use of this potent instrument.
62 Patrick Jenkins, ‘Why EU banks have become a money launderer’s dream’, Financial Times, 17 September 2018
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supervision generates national vicious circles, which tend to be self-perpetuating rather than 
self-correcting63. 
In this ‘AML vicious circle’ analytical framework, money-laundering and AML violations 
end up being asymmetrically distributed in the European Union. Some member states 
become weak links from which clients can be served throughout the entire single market, for 
those activities for which a passporting regime exists. Not all member states need be weak 
links for money launderers to achieve their objectives. As long as at least one weak link exists, 
the entire AML system is at risk of failure. A corollary is that, even if some EU member states 
have highly effective AML frameworks, it does not disprove the assessment of the AML prob-
lem as systemic and a matter of EU supervisory architecture. Furthermore, it is not enough to 
eliminate a weak link – even if the vicious circle is broken in one member state, it is likely to 
reappear in another. Also, not all weak-link countries need be smaller member states. While 
insufficient administrative capacity may be a more acute problem in very small countries, 
undue influence from certain special interests or other forms of institutional failure can affect 
larger countries as well. The variety of patterns of deficiencies in AML regimes in the Euro-
pean Union are illustrated in Annex 1. 
To be sure, in theory national AML authorities in the other member states check transac-
tions originating in the weak-link countries and should be able to spot suspicious activity. But 
this can be ineffective in practice, given national authorities’ capacity constraints and priori-
ties, and given the dense web of relationships and interdependencies that exist between them 
within the single market. Furthermore, within the euro/banking union area, any national 
authority’s AML supervisory failure potentially compromises the integrity of the entire pru-
dential supervisory framework (and of the licensing, qualifying holdings and F&P review pro-
cesses) to the extent that it relies on AML assessments, as ABLV and other cases have shown. 
Moreover, the likely future development of financial technology and of new business models 
for financial intermediation and services that are inherently cross-border is likely to exacer-
bate the tension between the single market framework and national AML supervision64. 
Addressing the AML vicious circle: two-tier vs unitary architecture
To deal with the European Union’s core AML supervisory problem, the incentives of AML 
supervisors should be aligned with the objective of effectively enforcing the AML framework 
and fighting money laundering throughout the entire single market. Breaking the vicious 
circle thus requires the introduction of a significant element of EU-level supervision, beyond 
the limited oversight that already exists. 
On that basis, the EU faces a choice between two models. In an enhanced two-tier archi-
tecture that builds on the present situation, the ultimate responsibility for AML supervision of 
individual firms would remain at the national level, but an EU authority would be empowered 
to exercise some form of surveillance over national AML supervisors (‘supervisor of supervi-
sors’)65. In a unitary architecture, a European agency would have ultimate AML supervisory 
responsibility for firms, though this responsibility might be exercised through a network that 
involves national agencies and other European-level bodies. 
This has become a familiar distinction in matters of European financial supervision 
over the past decade. Before the 2009 Larosière Report, financial supervision was entirely 
63 Panicos Demetriades, a former governor of the Central Bank of Cyprus, gave a vivid description of this vicious 
circle: “The ‘political pressure’ on supervisors in small EU states with large offshore sectors, such as Cyprus, Estonia, 
Latvia, and Malta ‘is so great that it’s very hard for them to do the right thing,’ Demetriades said.” Quoted in Andrew 
Rettman, ‘Cyprus: Russia’s EU weak link?’, EUobserver, 25 September 2018.
64 This argument is made more broadly for conduct-of-business supervision of fintech firms by Demertzis et al 
(2018).
65 A two-tier architecture might also entail technical assistance from the central hub to the member states that need 
it to improve their national frameworks.
16 Policy Contribution | Issue n˚19 | October 2018
national66. Subsequently, a comprehensive two-tier architecture was established with the cre-
ation of the three ESAs, encompassing prudential, conduct-of-business and AML supervision 
of financial firms. In 2011, ESMA was assigned direct supervisory authority over credit rating 
agencies (CRAs), and, in 2013, over trade repositories (TRs), thus establishing a unitary super-
visory system for these two market segments. The SSM is an almost pure unitary system67. 
In a different area, competition policy enforcement in the European Union is also a unitary 
architecture centred on the European Commission’s Directorate-General for Competition68.
Given the experience of the SSM, and taking into account the differences between pruden-
tial and AML supervision, a well-designed unitary architecture for AML supervision would be 
a practical proposition, as would a reinforced two-tier model as proposed in mid-September 
2018 by the European Commission (section 3). To be sure, current AML legislation in the 
European Union is less of a single rulebook than many other areas of financial legislation, 
including the capital requirements that the SSM enforces. But a situation in which a Euro-
pean-level authority would be in charge of enforcing poorly harmonised national law is not 
unprecedented, and, while clearly sub-optimal, can be made to work. One example is the 
ECB’s fit-and-proper vetting of senior executives of the euro area’s SI banks (see section 3). 
The experience of the SSM, and in particular of its work on so-called Options and National 
Discretions since 2015, suggests that the establishment of a unitary European supervisory 
mandate can be a catalyst for the development of policy expertise towards further regula-
tory harmonisation. There is in principle no legal obstacle to the imposition of fines or other 
restrictions on individual firms by a European agency, as illustrated by the existing practice of 
the SSM (for banks) and of ESMA (for CRAs and TRs)69. In sum, the establishment of a unitary 
architecture need not await the creation of a single rulebook for AML supervision and can be 
expected to vastly accelerate its emergence70. 
A unitary architecture would entail a significantly simpler system, essentially resolving all 
issues of information sharing between AML supervisors and of allocation of tasks between 
home and host authorities within its geographical scope. The reduced risk of confusion of 
responsibilities would be positive for the overall legitimacy and accountability of the super-
visory system, and for its effectiveness. The reduced administrative friction between different 
supervisory authorities would reduce both overall operating costs and the risk of errors and 
omissions; the efficiency of the system would be further enhanced by economies of scale, eg 
in terms of specialist expertise and skills. If implemented with a proper articulation of oper-
ational tasks between the national and European levels, as is broadly the case with JSTs in 
the SSM (see section 3), a unitary system would not entail a loss of local knowledge or of the 
ability to communicate properly with supervised entities, national law enforcement agencies 
or national FIUs. As Ms Nouy has repeatedly argued in describing the SSM’s supervision of 
euro-area SIs, such arrangements provide “the best of both worlds: the experience of national 
supervisors, while also keeping some distance from individual banks” and the related risks of 
66 The three sector-specific bodies that prefigured the ESAs in the 2000s, known as the Lamfalussy Level-3 Commit-
tees, were not authoritative enough to be viewed as ‘supervisors of supervisors’.
67 The European Commission’s initial draft of the SSM Regulation in September 2012 envisaged a pure unitary 
system for the prudential supervision of all banks in the euro area. In the legislative discussion that followed, Ger-
many successfully insisted on keeping the day-to-day supervision of LSIs at the national level (see section 3), but 
the ECB, not NCAs, is the ultimate decision-maker for bank licensing and the other common procedures, implying 
that it is much more than a mere ‘supervisor of supervisors’.
68 The competition directorate-general, in turn, has delegated back to national competition authorities the handling 
of cases that lack a European dimension.
69 The ability of EU agencies such as the ESAs to make decisions that are binding on individual firms has been estab-
lished by the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union, including the Meroni judgment of 13 
June 1958 (case 9-56) and the short-selling judgment of 22 January 2014 (case C-270/12).
70 There is no compelling case for introducing in AML supervision a divide similar to that in the SSM between SIs 
and LSIs. This is because the most significant and complex AML breaches often occur in comparatively small 
firms. Therefore, the EU principle of proportionality does not apply to AML supervision the same way as it does to 
prudential supervision. 
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political interference71. Once in place, a unitary architecture also reduces the scope for politi-
cal conflict between European and national authorities in the event of diverging views, which 
is embedded in any two-tier system. 
On the basis of the SSM experience since 2014, the supervisory effectiveness of the 
European agency under a unitary architecture should be significantly greater than that of 
the weaker member states’ AML supervisors, and not necessarily less than the best current 
national practice. Conversely, in a two-tier system, even with forceful capacity at the hub, 
weak links will inevitably remain. As such, even to the extent that an effective two-tier system 
may be able to spot malpractice, a unitary system is bound to do so at an earlier stage and to 
be more proactive in taking appropriate action. For similar reasons, a unitary system would 
be more resilient than a two-tier system against the possibility of erosion of the rule of law in 
a given member state, even though it would cover only AML supervision and not the FIU and 
law-enforcement pillars of the AML framework. 
A unitary system would also greatly enhance and facilitate the European AML supervisor’s 
cooperation and information-sharing with its counterparts in other jurisdictions, not least the 
United States. While this would not deprive the US government of its ability to act unilaterally, 
eg by wielding its authority under Section 311 of the PATRIOT Act (see section 4), it would 
likely help ensure that the use of such instruments would remain selective, as it appears to 
have been so far. At the global level, a unitary European architecture would reduce the com-
plexity of FATF processes, as fewer European participants would need to be directly involved. 
Conversely, the main advantage of a two-tier architecture is the more incremental nature 
of the change compared to the status quo. But for it to be effective, the central agency will 
need to have strong powers in terms of access to information and enforcement capabilities, 
which ultimately raise similar political challenges as those inherent in a unitary system72. 
On balance, a unitary architecture for AML supervision in the European Union is feasible, 
simpler than a two-tier system, likely to be significantly more effective, compliant with the 
principle of subsidiarity and generally preferable. 
There are parallels between the AML vicious circle and the bank-sovereign vicious circle 
that ultimately led to the establishment of Europe’s banking union. In both cases, the coex-
istence of the single market and euro-area frameworks with national banking supervision 
(respectively prudential and AML) led to perverse incentives for national authorities and 
ultimately to pervasive supervisory and crisis-management failures (Véron, 2013). In both 
cases, an attempt was made to address the problem with a two-tier architecture: the EBA was 
created in 2011 in the midst of Europe’s decade-long banking system crisis, which was ulti-
mately resolved thanks to the creation of the SSM. Unlike the earlier institutional mismatch 
in the prudential space, Europe’s AML problem should be comprehensively tackled before it 
grows to a critical systemic dimension. 
Which agency at the hub? 
If a decision to move towards a unitary architecture is taken, then one or several European 
agency/ies needs to be empowered to that effect. The European AML supervisor(s) may be an 
existing agency, or a new one, or different agencies for different categories of obliged entities. 
There are at least seven different options: 
• The ECB as single AML supervisor of euro-area banks, in addition to its existing role as 
prudential supervisor (Option 1); 
• Each ESA for its respective area: EBA for banks, EIOPA for insurers and ESMA for other 
financial firms (Option 2); 
71 As paraphrased, for example, in the Council of the EU’s partial summary record of the meeting of the ECON 
Committee of the European Parliament held in Brussels on 3-4 November 2014, available at http://data.consilium.
europa.eu/doc/document/ST-15376-2014-INIT/en/pdf.
72 The European Commission’s proposal of 12 September 2018 stopped well short of that objective. 
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• EBA for all financial firms or even all obliged entities (Option 3)73; 
• ESMA for all financial firms or even all obliged entities (Option 4); 
• A joint venture of the three ESAs, building on the existing AMLC (Option 5); 
• A dedicated new agency, which may be referred to as the European AML Authority or 
EAMLA (Option 6)74;
• A dedicated new agency with authority over only a subset of member states, established 
through a process of enhanced cooperation (Option 7). 
The following analysis is intended as a preliminary exploration of the main advantages 
and shortcomings of these options, pending a more comprehensive assessment. Option 7 is 
only a fall-back option in case all others would lead to political deadlock. This is unlikely to be 
the case, however, since Options 2-6 can all be implemented through EU single market legis-
lation (on the basis of Article 114 TFEU), which only requires approval by a qualified majority 
of EU member states75. 
Option 1 has immediate appeal given the generally solid performance of the ECB as a 
banking supervisor, and it has been mentioned in public by a senior German official76. But it 
also has several drawbacks. Like Option 7, it does not cover the entire single market, leaving 
space for a continued AML vicious circle affecting countries outside the banking union area. 
This is a concern in any case, and particularly if, as appears possible at the time of writing, the 
UK remains in the European single market for an undetermined period of time following its 
planned exit from the European Union in late March 201977. 
Moreover, Option 1 would presumably be based on Article 127(6) TFEU, like the SSM, 
raising challenges of both procedure (unanimity) and legal robustness78. Article 127(6) also 
specifically refers to “credit institutions and other financial institutions with the exception of 
insurance undertakings”, so the sectoral scope beyond banks would be correspondingly lim-
ited. Furthermore, adding the AML task to the ECB’s already heavy burden of responsibilities 
might create too much centralisation of authority in a single institution, given the compara-
tively fragile framework for general-purpose executive authority and democratic scrutiny at 
the European level79. 
Options 2, 3, 4 and 5 all build on the existing structures of the three ESAs. Option 2 is the 
most straightforward but has the drawback of entrenching fragmentation of AML supervision 
along sectoral lines, which the US experience suggests is suboptimal (section 4). The draw-
backs of such sectoral fragmentation can be expected to be increasingly significant in the 
future, as the emergence of new financial technologies might blur the boundaries between 
73 This option is hinted at as a long-term outcome by the European Commission Communication of 12 September 
2018 (COM(2018) 645). However, the European Commission’s legislative proposal of the same day stops short of 
Option 3, since it entails a two-tier and not a unitary architecture for AML supervision.
74 A variant of Option 6, which we do not here further explore, might be the creation of a dedicated new Euro-
pean Commission directorate-general, modelled on the existing framework for competition policy under the 
competition directorate-general, which would take over the AML supervisory mandate directly. This would not 
be functionally very different from a new EU agency, but it would entail a different framework for governance, 
accountability and funding.
75 In the EU context, ‘qualified majority’ refers to a specific supermajority of member states defined in the EU trea-
ties. Under the currently applicable Lisbon Treaty, it implies approval by at least 55 percent of member states (16 
out of 28) representing at least 65 percent of the EU population.
76 See Alexander Weber, ‘Money-Laundering Scandals Prompt EU Rethink on Policing Banks’, Bloomberg, 2 Octo-
ber 2018, which quotes State Secretary Jörg Kukies from Germany’s Federal Finance Ministry.
77 If the UK leaves the single market it will be treated as a third country for AML purposes, as is currently the case 
with Switzerland.
78 It is not clear that the reference in Article 127(6) TFEU to “specific tasks […] concerning policies relating to […] 
prudential supervision” can be understood as including AML supervision in addition to the prudential supervisory 
tasks already conferred on the ECB by the SSM Regulation. It is also not clear that the ECB could be granted an 
AML supervisory mandate under another treaty article, eg Article 114 TFEU.
79 Similar considerations led in 2012-13 to the decision to build the SRM entirely outside of the ECB, a decision that 
the ECB supported.
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subsectors of finance and correspondingly open new avenues for regulatory arbitrage.
Option 3 might be justified by the fact that publicly identified AML failures have been 
particularly prominent in the European banking sector, and that the EBA has been so far the 
most active of the three ESAs in the AML field80. But the EBA does not otherwise have experi-
ence with, or a mandate for, direct supervision, and it is unlikely to gain such authority in the 
future. Moreover, the members of the EBA’s Board of Supervisors are designated by national 
prudential supervisory authorities, not all of which have AML duties, creating a potential gov-
ernance misalignment. Having the EBA supervise firms other than banks may create further 
awkward mismatches.
By contrast, ESMA (Option 4) has existing direct supervisory experience and is likely to 
gain more in the future (eg over central counterparties). It also has more experience with 
cross-sectoral oversight81. Option 5 has the advantage of being cross-sectoral but may suffer 
from too much complexity and a deficit of accountability in the corresponding governance 
arrangements. 
The obvious drawback of Option 6 is that the creation of a new agency would add to 
the complexity of the EU financial regulatory landscape in general. But it would provide a 
straightforward and cross-sectoral solution to the specific challenge of AML supervision. 
It would also benefit from the possibility of learning from the early experience of the three 
ESAs and of other European bodies, including the SSM and the Single Resolution Board 
(the Brussels-based hub of the SRM). The EAMLA could thus be provided with an optimised 
governance and funding framework from the outset. This model would have further potential 
advantages from the standpoint of the ‘twin-peaks’ vision, as it would be separated from the 
prudential concerns of the ESAs and the SSM. A separate agency might also be preferable in 
terms of ring-fencing sensitive information about potentially criminal activity. 
An initial blueprint for EAMLA
From the options analysed, the creation of a new European AML Authority (Option 6) emerg-
es as the best response to the current challenges of AML in the European Union. Its establish-
ment would inevitably take some time, but the decision to set it up need not be postponed. 
EU leaders’ current heightened awareness of AML challenges justifies an overhaul of the 
EU’s AML supervisory architecture without delay. While enacting new legislation within the 
current European Parliament term might not appear realistic, leaders could take a decision in 
principle in the immediate near term, with a mandate for the next European Commission to 
propose legislation accordingly. 
If so, one could realistically envisage an effective transfer of supervisory authority to 
EAMLA starting around late 2022, allowing for one year’s legislative debate and two years for 
institutional build-up and recruitment, which is significantly more than was the case for the 
ESAs or the SSM. The transfer could itself be gradual to allow for lessons from early expe-
rience, eg starting with banks in 2022 and subsequently adding other categories of obliged 
entities. Before 2022, the existing two-tier architecture would remain in place, possibly with 
the limited enhancement proposed by the European Commission on 12 September 2018. 
The governance of EAMLA should take into account the experience of the ESAs, including 
ongoing debates on the ESAs Review, and of the Single Resolution Board. It should rely on a 
compact collective decision-making board of fewer than ten members, including the agency’s 
chair82. All members of that board should be individually vetted by the European Parliament, 
80 The EBA’s existing capacity and experience should not be exaggerated however, since the August 2018 discussion 
paper (see footnote 43) states that its entire staff for AML tasks is fewer than two full-time equivalents. 
81 Furthermore, there is a scenario in which ESMA could acquire some supervisory responsibilities in the future 
over banks and insurers, if the EU adopts a ‘twin-peaks’ vision for the long-term evolution of its general financial 
supervisory architecture, ie a separation of prudential oversight from conduct-of-business supervision (Schoen-
maker and Véron, 2017).
82 A larger body could be set up with every member state represented, but only for consultative purposes in the 
process of drafting new rules, not for individual supervisory decisions. 
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thus creating legitimacy and accountability. The agency’s funding should be through a levy 
directly collected from supervised entities, similar to the funding of the SSM. 
The steady-state size of EAMLA staff depends on how much of its supervisory work would 
be delegated to other bodies – other EU agencies such as the SSM (for banks), or national 
AML supervisors, or both. EAMLA would need staff for policy work and rule drafting, simi-
larly to the ESAs83. For supervisory work, EAMLA could rely on hybrid teams of its own staff 
and those of other supervisors for both regular and targeted examinations. In the banking 
sector, delegation to prudential supervisors would create significantly less friction than is the 
case in the United States, because the institutional framework is significantly more integrated 
with an all-encompassing role for the SSM (in the banking union area) and no reliance on pri-
vate-sector self-regulatory organisations (unlike FINRA and the NFA in the US). Even so, the 
staff needs of an effective EAMLA could easily reach several hundred, especially if (as might 
be desirable) it is granted AML supervisory authority over all categories of obliged entities 
including non-financial entities. 
Other matters
Getting the supervisory architecture right is the current central challenge of AML policy in the 
European Union, but it is not the only challenge. The content of applicable AML legislation 
might also be ripe for improvement. But the fact that AMLD5 was very recently enacted and 
is not yet transposed, let alone enforced, suggests a more delayed timetable for the corre-
sponding policy discussions. Given that experience, it makes sense to create a European AML 
supervisor ahead of any attempt at, for example, an AML Regulation (AMLR) that would move 
EU law in that area closer to the vision of a single rulebook84. As we have noted, the experience 
of the SSM, which has played and continues to play a catalyst role for the gradual elimination 
of options and national discretions in the prudential rulebook for banks, argues in favour of 
such sequencing. 
Similarly, supervisory integration should unlock improvements in two areas where the 
European Union has substantial scope for improvement, namely AML fines (in terms of both 
cross-border consistency and overall size) and the transparent publication of individual AML 
decisions (which is currently lacking in a number of member states; see section 3). The EU 
should aim to impose fines with a genuinely dissuasive impact and should expect detailed 
public announcements of all individual decisions containing the name of the subject entity, 
the nature of the alleged AML violations and the size of the penalty. Since some member 
states already impose large fines and/or publish their decisions with appropriate detail, it is 
presumed that no obstacle to this exists in EU law. Any lingering legal obstacles should be 
removed, as they are unlikely to be linked to fundamental principles. 
Other AML-related issues deserve the attention of the EU and its institutions. One 
example is the longstanding matter of high-denomination euro notes, which provide a user-
friendly way to move large amounts of cash and thus potentially to evade AML controls. In 
May 2016, the ECB announced it would no longer issue new €500 notes (even though the 
outstanding stock remains legal tender)85, but it has not yet extended this action to the €200 
let alone €100 notes. For comparison, the highest-denomination notes are of 100 units for the 
US dollar, 50 for the British pound and 100 for the Chinese renminbi86. 
83 Under the Meroni and short-selling jurisprudence (footnote 69), EAMLA is unlikely to be empowered as an autono-
mous rulemaker (beyond the issuance of non-binding opinions, guidelines and recommendations) but would 
draft binding technical standards for approval by the European Commission.
84 An AMLR may or may not be needed to achieve maximum harmonisation, which can also be pursued through 
directives. Correspondingly, it is possible that the optimal steady state includes a combination of regulation(s) and 
directive(s), as is currently the case for the EU bank capital requirements legislation. No in-depth investigation of 
the corresponding trade-offs has been done in the preparation of this paper.
85 ECB announcement available at https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2016/html/pr160504.en.html.
86 See eg Sands (2016) for the case for eliminating high-denomination notes, and Hellwig (2017) for a sceptical per-
spective from Germany.
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We leave open the question of whether the FIU pillar of Europe’s AML regime should also 
undergo supranational integration in the future. The creation of an EU-level FIU was recom-
mended in a 2016 report (EU FIUs’ Platform, 2016); was considered but ultimately rejected 
in the European Parliament discussion of AMLD5 (Giegold, 2017); and more recently was 
recommended by Latvia’s Finance Minister, among others87. Since the most notable recent 
AML cases in the European Union have tended to be concentrated in the banking sector and 
linked to failures of AML supervision, AML supervisory integration appears more urgent than 
a European FIU. Establishing an EU FIU also appears comparatively more challenging from 
both political and technical perspectives, given how the activities of FIUs are embedded in 
member states’ specific arrangements for criminal justice, law enforcement and intelligence 
gathering and analysis. If the creation of a European AML Authority is undertaken and suc-
ceeds, then the case for a European FIU might become more realistic than it is now.
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Annex 1: Selected bank-related AML 
developments in the European Union
Austria (covered by the Single Supervisory Mechanism – SSM)
In 2018, Austria’s Financial Market Authority (FMA) fined Raiffeisen Bank (SI) €2.7 million for 
AML violations, including beneficial ownership and customer due diligence failures88. The 
FMA also fined Hypo Vorarlberg Bank (LSI) €414,000 for AML violations that year.
Cyprus (SSM)
In 2018, the Central Bank of Cyprus (CBC) fined Cyprus Development Bank (LSI) €715,000 for 
AML violations89. Also in 2018, the CBC issued a circular previewing forthcoming regulations 
that will restrict the holding of accounts for shell companies90. Similar fines were imposed in 
2017 and 2016 against RCB Bank (SI) and Hellenic Bank (SI)91. In 2014-15, the CBC initiated 
resolution and liquidation proceedings for FBME Bank and revoked its branch license92. 
88 Announcement available on the FMA’s website at https://www.fma.gv.at/en/announcement-sanction-imposed-
against-raiffeisen-bank-international-ag-for-a-breach-of-due-diligence-requirements-for-the-prevention-of-mon-
ey-laundering-and-terrorist-financing/. 
89 Announcement available on the CBC’s website at https://www.centralbank.cy/en/announcements/imposi-
tion-of-fine-on-cyprus-development-bank-ltd. 
90 Elias Hazou, ‘Under the US cosh? The crackdown on money laundering’, Cyprus Mail, 30 June 2018. See also Kir-
schenbaum (2018c). 
91 Announcements available on the CBC’s website at https://www.centralbank.cy/en/announcements/imposition-of-
fine-on-rcb-bank-ltd and https://www.centralbank.cy/en/announcements/15072016. 
92 FBME in Cyprus was a branch of FBME Bank Ltd, headquartered in Tanzania, but it conducted the bulk of the 
consolidated group’s activity. 
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FBME had been the subject of a US Treasury Department action under Section 311 of the 
PATRIOT Act in 201493. 
Czech Republic (non-SSM)
In 2016, the Czech National Bank revoked the license of ERB Bank, which it found lacked a 
functioning AML system94.
Denmark (non-SSM)
In 2018, Danish prosecutors announced a new probe into Danske Bank after the bank’s publi-
cation of an internal report that disclosed that over €200 billion in transactions flowed through 
its Estonian branch over a nine-year period, of which at least 40 percent was potentially suspi-
cious. The Danish Financial Supervisory Authority (FSA) also announced a new investigation, 
and the bank’s CEO resigned95.  In September 2018, at the European Commission’s request, the 
European Banking Authority (EBA) started a breach-of-Union-law preliminary enquiry into 
AML supervision of Danske Bank in Denmark and Estonia96. In 2017, Danish prosecutors had 
fined the bank DKK 12.5 million following the receipt of a 2015 referral from the FSA. 
Estonia (SSM)
In 2018, prosecutors opened a criminal investigation into the Estonian branch (LSI) of Danske 
Bank97. In September 2018, the EBA started a breach-of-Union-law enquiry into AML supervi-
sion of Danske Bank in Denmark and Estonia (see Denmark). Also in 2018, the Estonian FSA 
announced that the ECB had withdrawn the license of Versobank (LSI) at its request98.
France (SSM)
In 2017 and 2018, the Autorité de Contrôle Prudential et de Résolution (ACPR) fined two 
entities of the Crédit Mutuel group (SI) a total of €2.5 million, a member bank of the Crédit 
Agricole group (SI) €2 million, Société Générale (SI) €5 million, and BNP Paribas (SI) €10 
million for AML violations, including failures related to the filing of suspicious transaction 
reports and the detection of suspicious activity99. 
93 Announcements available respectively on FinCEN’s website at https://www.fincen.gov/news/news-releases/
fincen-takes-action-protect-us-financial-system, on the CBC’s website at https://www.centralbank.cy/images/
media/pdf/ENG_KDP_356.2014_FBME.pdf, and in the District Court judgment available at https://www.gzg.
com.cy/media/filer_public/dd/36/dd3634f0-d6b0-4743-b35c-f33d61b6df0f/fbme_liquidation_application_judg-
ment_10052017.pdf. 
94 Announcement available on the Czech National Bank’s website at https://www.cnb.cz/en/public/media_service/
press_releases_cnb/2016/20161024_erb_bank_licence.html. 
95 Danish FSA memorandum and internal report available on Danske Bank’s website at https://danskebank.com/-/
media/danske-bank-com/pdf/investor-relations/fsa-statements/fsa-decision-re-danske-bank-3-may-2018-.-la=en.
pdf and https://danskebank.com/-/media/danske-bank-com/file-cloud/2018/9/report-on-the-non-resident-
portfolio-at-danske-banks-estonian-branch-.-la=en.pdf. See also Teis Jensen, ‘Under fire Danske bank faces fresh 
money laundering inquiry’, Reuters, 20 September 2018; Stine Jacobsen and Jacob Gronholt-Perdersen, ‘Denmark 
to investigate Danske Bank over money laundering allegations’, Reuters, 6 August 2018; and Danske Bank’s own 
announcement of the 2017 fine at https://danskebank.com/news-and-insights/news-archive/company-announce-
ments/2017/ca21122017.
96 The European Commission’s letter is available at https://www.eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/2101654/
Letter+from+Tiina+Astola+requesting+an+investigation+on+possible+BUL+under+Article+17+of+Regula-
tion+%28EU%29%20No+10932010+-+21092018.pdf. 
97 Teis Jensen, ‘Estonia to investigate Danske Bank over money laundering allegations’, Reuters, 31 July 2018. 
98 Announcement available on the Estonian FSA’s website at https://www.fi.ee/index.php?id=22632; see also Kir-
schenbaum (2018a).
99 Announcements available on the ACPR’s website respectively at https://acpr.banque-france.fr/sites/default/
files/media/2018/04/19/180418_decision_cfcmne.pdf, https://acpr.banque-france.fr/sites/default/files/
media/2018/07/06/180705_decision_cfcm_publiee.pdf, https://acpr.banque-france.fr/sites/default/files/me-
dia/2017/10/13/20170704-decision-sanction-crcam-av.pdf, https://acpr.banque-france.fr/sites/default/files/
546ta17_20170719_societe_generale-en.docx, and https://acpr.banque-france.fr/sites/default/files/20170630_bnp_
paribas.pdf. 
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Germany (SSM)
Germany’s Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin) does not publish individual 
sanction decisions. According to press reports, BaFin fined Deutsche Bank (SI) €40 million for 
AML violations in 2015100.
Ireland (SSM)
In 2017, the Central Bank of Ireland fined Bank of Ireland (SI) €3.1 million for AML violations, 
including the failure to file suspicious transaction reports101.
Latvia (SSM) 102
In 2016, the Financial and Capital Markets Commission (FCMC) imposed an AML fine against 
ABLV (SI), and in 2018 ABLV was the subject of an action by the US Treasury Department 
under Section 311 of the PATRIOT Act (see section 4) and was subsequently liquidated103. 
Subsequently, at the European Commission’s request, the EBA started a breach-of-Union-law 
preliminary enquiry into AML supervision of ABLV104. In 2017, the FCMC fined five banks – 
Baltikums Bank (LSI), Privatbank (LSI), Regional Investment Bank (LSI), Norvik Bank (LSI), 
and Rietumu Bank (LSI) – for AML violations including violations related to activity involving 
North Korea105. On the recommendation of the FCMC, the ECB in 2016 withdrew the license of 
Trasta Komercbanka (LSI) on the grounds of capital adequacy problems and AML violations106. 
Luxembourg (SSM)
In 2017, the Commission de Surveillance du Secteur Financier fined DNB Luxembourg SA 
(LSI), Nordea Bank SA (LSI) and local operations of Crédit Agricole (SI) and Novo Banco (SI), 
for AML violations107.
Malta (SSM)
In 2018, the Maltese FSA filed a referral to the ECB recommending the withdrawal of Pilatus 
Bank (LSI)’s license108. The EBA conducted a preliminary enquiry into the Pilatus case under 
its breach-of-Union-law authority and found “general and systematic shortcomings in the 
FIAU’s application of AMLD3” (EBA, 2018b). 
Netherlands (SSM)
In 2018, the Netherlands Public Prosecution Service fined ING (SI) €775 million for money 
laundering violations that facilitated illicit activity including bribery in Uzbekistan. The Dutch 
National Bank said in a letter to the finance minister that other Dutch banks might also have 
100 See Arno Schuetze and Jonathan Gould, ‘Bafin fines Deutsche Bank for anti-money laundering flaws: source’, 
Reuters, 24 June 2016.
101 Announcement available on the Central Bank of Ireland’s website at https://www.centralbank.ie/docs/de-
fault-source/news-and-media/legal-notices/settlement-agreements/public-statement-relating-to-settlement-agree-
ment-between-central-bank-of-ireland-and-bank-of-ireland.pdf. 
102 A detailed analysis of recent AML-related developments in Latvia is provided in Kirschenbaum (2018b). 
103 Announcement available on the FCMC’s website at http://www.fktk.lv/en/publications/press-releases/5769-
fcmc-and-ablv. FinCEN’s statement on ABLV is available at https://www.fincen.gov/news/news-releases/fin-
cen-names-ablv-bank-latvia-institution-primary-money-laundering-concern-and. 
104 The European Commission’s letter is available at https://www.eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/2101654/
Letter+from+Tiina+Astola+requesting+an+investigation+on+possible+BUL+under+Article+17+of+Regula-
tion+%28EU%29%20No+10932010+-+01032018.pdf. 
105 Announcements available on FCMC’s website at http://www.fktk.lv/en/publications/press-releases/5769-fcmc-
and-ablv and http://www.fktk.lv/en/media-room/press-releases/6429-fcmc-in-collaboration-with-u-s-law-en-
forcement-authorities-identifies-weaknesses-and-imposes-monetary-fines-on-three-banks.html. 
106 Announcement available on FCMC’s website at http://www.fktk.lv/en/publications/press-releases/5636-withdraw-
al-of-authorisation-of-jsc-trasta-komercbanka.html. 
107 See Martine Huberty, ‘Panama Papers: Fines for 9 Financial Institutions’, Delano, 21 December 2017. 
108 Announcement available on the Maltese FSA’s website at https://www.mfsa.com.mt/pages/readfile.aspx?f=/files/
Announcements/PressReleases/2018/MFSA%20PR%2030%20June%20Pilatus.pdf. 
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inadequate AML controls109. In 2017, the Fiscal Information and Investigation Service raided 
Amsterdam Trade Bank (LSI) as part of an investigation into the bank’s failure to comply with 
suspicious activity reporting and customer due diligence obligations110. 
Portugal (SSM)
In 2016, the EBA liaised with the Bank of Portugal regarding its implementation of the qual-
ifying holdings approval process in two instances in which an Angolan politically exposed 
person purchased stakes in Banco BIC (LSI) and BPI (SI)111.
Spain (SSM)
In 2017, prosecutors started an investigation into suspected money laundering through the 
Madrid branch of Industrial and Commercial Bank of China’s Luxembourg subsidiary (LSI)112. 
In 2016, the Supreme Court upheld a €1 million AML fine against Banco Santander (SI) im-
posed by Spain’s Executive Service of the Commission for the Prevention of Money Launder-
ing and Monetary Offences and approved by the Council of Ministers in 2015113.
Sweden (non-SSM)
In 2015, the Swedish FSA imposed AML fines against Nordea and Handelsbanken of SEK 50 
million and SEK 35 million, respectively. Both banks were found to have committed violations 
related to non-resident customers, politically exposed persons, private banking and corre-
spondent banking114. 
United Kingdom (non-SSM)
In 2017, the UK Financial Conduct Authority fined Deutsche Bank (SI) £163 million for AML 
violations related to $10 billion in securities ‘mirror trades’115. In 2015, the FCA fined Barclays 
£72 million for inadequate AML controls related to a high-value transaction for politically 
exposed persons116. The head of the UK National Crime Agency declared that “many hundreds 
of billions of pounds of criminal money is almost certainly laundered through UK banks and 
their subsidiaries each year” (Bristow, 2015). 
109 See Kirschenbaum (2018e) and Bart Meijer, ‘Dutch banks too lax on money laundering: central bank’, Reuters, 25 
September 2018. 
110 See Aleya Begum Lønsetteig, ‘Amsterdam Trade Bank under new money laundering investigation’, Global Trade 
Review, 20 December 2017. 
111 See EBA letter to Ana Gomes MEP, 16 December 2016, available at http://www.anagomes.eu/Public-
Docs/261636e6-407c-4dda-b6be-4b4735a2b1e1.pdf. 
112 See Angus Berwick, David Lague and Jesús Aguado, ‘Spain probes ICBC’s European unit over money laundering’, 
Reuters, 11 September 2017. 
113 See Paul Day and Angus Berwick, ‘Banco Santander fined 1 mln euros for failing to stop money laundering’, Reu-
ters, 28 November 2016; and Reyes Rincón, ‘Multa de un millón de euros al Santander porque Banesto incumplio 
la ley contra el blanqueo’, El Pais, 28 November 2016.
114 See Jonathan Boyd, ‘Swedish regulator fines, Nordea, Handelsbanken for AML failures’, Investment Europe, 19 
May 2015, and FSA announcements at https://www.fi.se/contentassets/b9fcac7ee33843b6b027b4832ed3848f/nor-
dea-13-1784-eng2.pdf and https://www.fi.se/contentassets/cc3028bcd3ce45b7b789713b277448b7/handelsbank-
en-13-1783-eng.pdf. 
115 Announcement available on the Financial Conduct Authority’s website at https://www.fca.org.uk/news/press-re-
leases/fca-fines-deutsche-bank-163-million-anti-money-laundering-controls-failure. Given the absence of disclo-
sure by BaFin, it is impossible to know if this case is related to the German case also referred to in Annex 1. 
116 Announcement available on the Financial Conduct Authority’s website at https://www.fca.org.uk/news/press-re-
leases/fca-fines-barclays-%C2%A372-million-poor-handling-financial-crime-risks. 
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Annex 2: AML supervisors for banks and Financial 
Intelligence Units in EU/EEA countries
Country AML Supervisor for banks FIU (acronym) (*) FIU setup
Austria Financial Market Authority 
(FMA)
Austrian FIU (A-FIU) Division of the Federal police force 
(Bundeskriminalamt)
Belgium Financial Services and 
Markets Authority (FSMA)
Belgian Financial Intelligence 
Processing Unit (CTIF-CFI)
Agency supervised by the Ministries 
of Justice and Finance
Bulgaria Bulgarian National Bank 
(BNB)
Financial Intelligence 
Directorate, State Agency for 
National Security (FID-SANS)
Directorate within the national 
counterintelligence agency
Croatia Croatian National Bank 
(HNB)
Anti-Money Laundering Office 
(AMLO)
Independent unit within the Ministry 
of Finance
Cyprus Central Bank of Cyprus (CBC) Unit for Combating Money 
Laundering (MOKAS)
Unit within the independent Law 
Office of the Republic
Czechia Czech National Bank (CNB) Financial Analytical Unit (FAU-
CR)
Independent unit of the Ministry of 
Finance
Denmark Finanstilsynet (Danish FSA) Money Laundering Secretariat 
(FIU Denmark)
Unit of the Prosecution Service
Estonia Finantsinspektioon (Estonian 
FSA)
FIU Estonia (Money 
Laundering Information 
Bureau / MLIB)
Independent unit of the Police and 
Border Guard Board
Finland Finanssivalvonta (Finnish 
FSA)
FIU (RAP) Unit of the National Bureau of 
Investigation, part of the national 
police
France Autorité de Contrôle 
Prudential et de Résolution 
(ACPR) under the Banque de 
France
Intelligence Processing and 
Action against Illicit Financial 
Networks Unit (TRACFIN)
Intelligence unit under the Ministry 
of Finance
Germany Bundesanstalt für 
Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht 
(BaFin)
FIU Germany Unit of the Customs Service, part of 
the Ministry of Finance
Greece Bank of Greece Hellenic FIU Unit of the Hellenic Anti-Money 
Laundering Authority (HAMLA) 
Hungary Hungarian National Bank 
(MNB)
Hungarian FIU (HFIU) Unit of the National Tax and Customs 
Administration
Iceland Fjármálaeftirlitið (Icelandic 
FSA)
FIU Iceland (FIU-ICE) Unit within the National Police
Ireland Central Bank of Ireland (CBI) Bureau of Fraud Investigation 
(MLIU)
Unit of the Garda National Economic 
Crime Bureau, part of the national 
police
Italy Bank of Italy and Ministry of 
Finance
FIU of Italy (UIF) Independent unit hosted by the Bank 
of Italy
Latvia Financial and Capital Markets 
Commission (FCMC)
Office for Prevention of 
Laundering of Proceeds 
derived from Criminal Activity 
(Control Service) (KD)
Independent authority under the 
supervision of the Prosecutor’s Office
Liechtenstein Financial Market Authority 
(FMA)
FIU Liechtenstein (EFFI) Independent administrative agency
Lithuania Bank of Lithuania Financial Crime Information 
Service (FCIS)
Service under the Ministry of the 
Interior
Luxembourg Commission de Surveillance 
du Secteur Financier
FIU (CRF) Unit of the Economic and Financial 
Prosecution Service under the 
Ministry of Justice
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Malta Financial Intelligence 
Analysis Unit (FIAU)
FIAU Independent agency
Netherlands Dutch National Bank (DNB) FIU Netherlands (FIU-NL) Independent agency
Norway Finanstilsynet (Norwegian 
FSA)
FIU Norway (EFE) Police specialist agency and 
prosecutor body
Poland General Inspector of Financial 
Information (GIFI)
GIFI Unit of the Ministry of Finance
Portugal Bank of Portugal FIU Portugal (UIF-Portugal) Department within the Criminal 
Police
Romania National Bank of Romania 
(BNR)
National Office for Prevention 
and Control of Money 
Laundering (ONPCSB)
Independent government agency
Slovakia National Bank of Slovakia FIU of the National Crime 
Agency (FSJ)
Unit of the Ministry of the Interior
Slovenia Bank of Slovenia Office for Money Laundering 
Prevention (OMLP)
Unit of the Ministry of Finance
Spain Executive Service of 
the Commission for the 
Prevention of Money 
Laundering and Monetary 
Offences (SEPBLAC)
SEPBLAC Unit of the Commission for the 
Prevention of Money Laundering and 
Monetary Offences (CPBCIM) under 
the Ministry of Economic Affairs
Sweden Finansinspektionen (Swedish 
FSA)
FIU Sweden Unit of the Swedish Police Authority
United 
Kingdom
Financial Conduct Authority 
(FCA)
UK FIU (NCA) Unit of the National Crime Agency, a 
national law enforcement agency
Gibraltar Financial Services 
Commission (FSC)
Gibraltar FIU (GCID-GFIU) Unit of the Co-ordinating Centre for 
Criminal Intelligence and Drugs
Sources: websites of the Egmont Group, of the Anti-Money Laundering Forum (https://www.anti-moneylaundering.org/) and of selected national agencies, consulted 2 September 2018. 
Note: Gibraltar is included in the list above because of its inclusion in the Internal Market. FSA refers to Financial Supervisory Authorities in Nordic countries and Estonia. (*) as listed by 
the Egmont Group. 
